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Introduction
Communications between a professional legal advisor and a cli-
ent made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal advice are
protected from compelled disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.1
The oldest of evidentiary privileges in common law, the attorney-cli-
ent privilege rests on a fundamental tenet of public policy: clients
must be able to confide in their counsel without fear that their confi-
dences will be disclosed to others.2 Typically, the privilege applies
only to attorneys admitted to practice law under a state bar. How-
ever, courts have expanded the application of the attorney-client priv-
ilege to include representatives of an attorney3 and persons
reasonably believed to be attorneys.4
This article focuses on whether a group of specialized legal pro-
fessionals-patent agents-should be included in the category of legal
advisors who are entitled to the attorney-client privilege. Patent
agents are licensed to handle all legal matters pertaining to the appli-
cation and issuance of patents from a Patent Office. Such matters in-
clude advising their clients regarding the patentability of their
inventions, drafting patent applications, arguing the merits of rejec-
tions by patent examiners, and appealing adverse decisions by the Pat-
ent Office. However, a patent agent's license is circumscribed; he is
not licensed to the general practice of law.
As a practical matter, the recognition or rejection of a privilege
for patent agents may be of critical importance during litigation in the
United States involving patent rights. If a party is represented only by
a patent agent during the process of obtaining the patent at issue, all
of the party's confidential communications with his patent agent could
be subject to compelled disclosure. These communications, for exam-
ple, could include the patent agent's legal conclusions regarding the
patentability of the invention at issue. In such cases, district courts
have been divided on the issue of whether patent agents should be
afforded privilege protection.5
This Article concludes that patent agents who function as legal
practitioners should be independently recognized as attorneys for the
purpose of the attorney-client privilege. Registered United States
1. 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 2292 (1961).
2. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
3. United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1989).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Ostrer, 422 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 26-53. This uncertainty undermines the purpose
of the privilege of free communication between a client and his legal advisor. See Upjohn,
449 U.S. at 393.
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patent agents are practitioners authorized by Congress to practice
only before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. United
States patent agents engage in the authorized practice of patent law
before the Patent Office, perform legal services, and are required to
preserve their clients' confidences and secrets. Similarly, when for-
eign patent agents function as legal practitioners, they too should be
recognized as attorneys in United States litigations.
Part I of this Article traces the development of courts' percep-
tions of the work of patent agents-from their initial viewpoint that
patent agents, and even attorneys who practice patent law, do not per-
form legal work to recognition by the United States Supreme Court
that patent agents perform Congressionally authorized legal functions.
Part II examines the divided case law on whether United States patent
agents should be afforded the attorney-client privilege. The divided
case law mirrors the diverse perceptions of the work and role of pat-
ent agents discussed in part I. Part II concludes that the better rea-
soned cases recognize a privilege for United States patent agents
because they perform the same function as attorneys who practice
patent law. Part III argues that the recognition of an attorney-client
privilege for United States patent agents should lead a fortiori to rec-
ognition by United States courts of an attorney-client privilege for
registered foreign patent agents who similarly function as legal practi-
tioners in their respective countries.
I
The Misperception and Reality of the Work of
Patent Agents
Recent opinions that have held that patent agents are not entitled
to be treated as attorneys for purposes of the attorney-client privilege
echo earlier cases which misperceived the legal nature of the work of
patent agents as well as patent attorneys admitted to a judicial bar.
Before the seminal United States Supreme Court case Sperry v. Flor-
ida,6 the majority of district courts held that neither attorneys who
practice patent law (otherwise known as "patent attorneys") nor pat-
ent agents performed legal work. While courts now unanimously rec-
ognize that patent attorneys perform legal work and are entitled to a
privilege, courts are still divided on whether patent agents are entitled
to privilege protection.
6. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
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A. Early Misperceptions of Patent Agents and Attorneys
In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,7 one of the ear-
liest cases to analyze the work of patent agents, also called "patent
solicitors," the District Court of Massachusetts held that communica-
tions with both patent solicitors and patent attorneys, admitted to
practice before a judicial bar, were not privileged. The court found
that the work of the patent solicitors and attorneys was not true legal
work:
All the men in the department function less as detailed legal advi-
sors than as a branch of an enterprise founded on patents. They are
comparable to the employees with legal training who serve in the
mortgage or trust departments of a bank or in the claims depart-
ment of an insurance company.8
The court disparaged the patent solicitors' and attorneys' work even
though it found that part of their time was spent examining "the scope
of public patents and [ the application of patent law to developments
by United and United's competitors."9
Similarly, in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America,"° the
court held that patent attorneys were not acting as lawyers when they
were performing functions
concerned with technical aspects of a business or engineering char-
acter, or competitive considerations in their companies' constant
race for patent proficiency, or the scope of public patents, or even
the general application of patent law to developments of their com-
panies and competitors; when making initial office preparatory de-
terminations of patentability based on inventor's information, prior
art, or legal tests for invention and novelty; when drafting or com-
paring patent specifications and'claims; when preparing the applica-
tion for letters patent or amendments thereto and prosecuting same
in the Patent Office; when handling interference proceedings in the
Patent Office concerning patent applications."
Judge Leahy clearly misapprehended the legal nature of this
work. He found that these were not "hallmark activities of attorneys"
and that the work could also be done by patent solicitors and other
non-lawyers. The court stated that "[a]ny citizen although not an at-
torney may qualify for practice before the Patent Office"' 2 and thus,
7. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
8. Id. at 360.
9. Id. at 360-61.
10. 121 F. Supp. 792 (D.Del. 1954).




implicitly reasoned that any work that could be done by patent agents
was not legal work, even if done by a patent attorney.13
On the other hand, other district courts before Sperry found that
the work of patent attorneys is legal work, and therefore, may be pro-
tected under the attorney-client privilege. In Ellis-Foster Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Co.,' 4 a New Jersey district court disagreed with
the court's reasoning in Zenith Radio, and held that even though pat-
ent agents capable of performing the same work as patent attorneys,
confidential communications between a client and a patent attorney
relating to legal advice may be privileged. The district court stated:
I am not completely in accord with Judge Leahy's conclusions with
reference to the work of those technicians who are both lawyers and
scientific specialists. Certainly a person not an attorney could per-
form many of the functions referred to by Shappirio [an attorney] in
his letters.... However, the admission of other than lawyers in the
field of patent practice should not be considered reason for break-
ing down well recognized and soundly based rules affecting the
claim of privilege. 5
Similarly, finding that communications with patent attorneys
could be privileged, the court in Chore-Time Equipment, Inc. v. Big
Dutchman, Inc., 6 stated: "Patent lawyers should not be banished to
the status of quasi-lawyers by reason of the fact that besides being
skilled in the law, they are also competent in scientific and technical
areas."'
7
Thus, early decisions by district courts were split on whether the
work of patent lawyers was legal work or merely technical work capa-
ble of being performed by patent agents, and, therefore, not privi-
leged. However, even the courts that were willing to recognize that
the work of patent attorneys is legal work and that patent agents per-
form the same work as patent attorneys, were unwilling to recognize
that patent agents should be treated as attorneys for the purpose of
the attorney-client privilege.' 8 Implicitly, these courts appeared to be
clinging to the rigid notion that communications with patent agents
could not be privileged because patent agents are not members of the
bar of any state, even if they do perform legal work.
13. See also Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463, 464
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) ("Communications dealing exclusively with the solicitation or giving of
business advice, or with the technical engineering aspects of patent procurement or with
any other matters which may as easily be handled by laymen are not privileged.").
14. 159 F. Supp. 917 (D.N.J.1958).
15. Id. at 920.
16. 255 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D., Mich. 1966).
17. Id. at 1023.
18. E.g., Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Big Dutchman, 255 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Mich.
1966); Ellis-Foster Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Co., 159 F. Supp. 917 (D.N.J. 1958).
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B. The Supreme Court's Landmark Case-Sperry v. Florida
In Sperry v. Florida,19 the United States Supreme Court defini-
tively held that patent agents (and a fortiori patent attorneys) are en-
gaged in the practice of law. In Sperry, the State of Florida enjoined a
registered United States patent agent from practicing patent law on
the ground that he was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Florida
Supreme Court, holding that while prosecuting patents was unques-
tionably the "practice of law," Congress had established special crite-
ria to enable one to practice patent law before the Patent Office, and
states were not permitted to interfere with the Congressional scheme.
First, under 35 U.S.C. § 231, Congress authorized the Commis-
sioner of Patents to determine the qualifications necessary to practice
in this special area of federal law. 20 The Patent Office regulations21
allow the registration of both attorneys and patent agents, if they ful-
fill the requirements of title 37 section 10.6 of the Code of Federal
Regulations.22
Second, with respect to the legal nature of patent practice, the
United States Supreme Court was crystal clear that patent agents
practice law:
We do not question the determination that under Florida law the
preparation and prosecution of patent applications for others con-
stitutes the practice of law.... Such conduct inevitably requires the
practitioner to consider and advise his clients as to the patentability
of their inventions under the statutory criteria, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-
103, 161, 171, as well as to consider the advisability of relying upon
alternative forms of protection which may be available under state
law. It also involves his participation in the drafting of the specifica-
tion and claims of the patent application, 35 U.S.C. § 112, which this
Court long ago noted "constitute[s] one of the most difficult legal
instruments to draw with accuracy.... And upon rejection of the
application, the practitioner may also assist in the preparation of
amendments, 37 CFR §§ 1.117-1.126, which frequently requires
written argument to establish the patentability of the claimed inven-
tion under the applicable rules of law and in light of the prior art. 37
CFR § 1.119. Nor do we doubt that Florida has a substantial interest
in regulating the practice of law within the State and that, in the
absence of federal legislation, it could validly prohibit nonlawyers
from engaging in this circumscribed form of patent practice. 23
19. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
20. Id. at 384.
21. 37 C.F.R. § 10 (1992).
22. The requirements include demonstrating "sufficient basic training in scientific and
technical matters" and "good moral character and repute" as well as passing an examina-
tion. 37 C.F.R. § 10.6 (1992).
23. Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 at 383.
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Despite this unambiguous statement by the United States
Supreme Court that patent agents engage in the authorized practice of
law, Sperry v. Florida did not immediately settle the issue of whether a
client's communication with a patent lawyer and patent agent could
be privileged.
Even a few years after Sperry, some district courts still clung to
the notion that patent lawyers did not perform legal work.24 Slowly,
however, district courts, based upon the reasoning in Sperry, began to
hold that patent attorneys should be afforded the status of an attorney
for purposes of the attorney-client privilege doctrine. Today courts
uniformly hold that the attorney-client privilege attaches to communi-
cations between clients and patent attorneys.25
Paradoxically, while the Supreme Court's decision in Sperry re-
lated to patent agents, many courts have been slow to realize the im-
plication of the decision regarding the issue of the attorney-client
privilege for patent agents. The status of patent agents and the attor-
ney-client privilege has yet to be definitely resolved thirty years after
Sperry.
II
Divided Law on Whether United States Patent
Agents Should Be Afforded Attorney-Client
Privilege Protection
District courts have been divided on whether patent agents regis-
tered to practice before the United States Patent Office should be
treated as attorneys for purposes of privilege protection.26 As ex-
24. See Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Big Dutchman, 255 F.Supp. 1020 (W.D. Mich.
1966); Underwater Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 548 (D.D.C. 1970)
(no privilege attaches to "determining patentability, drafting patent specifications, prepar-
ing and processing applications before the Patent Office"); Collins & Aickman Corp. v.
J.P. Stevens & Co., 51 F.R.D. 219 (D.S.C. 1971).
25. Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136 (D.Del. 1977) ("Since the Supreme
Court indicated in Sperry v. State of Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 83 S. Ct. 1322, 10 L. Ed. 2d 428
(1963) that the preparation and prosecution of patent applications are 'hallmark activities
of a lawyer', courts have consistently held that confidential communications between attor-
ney and client for the purpose of securing legal advice concerning preparation or prosecu-
tion of a patent application are protected, whether the attorney is employed as outside
counsel, house counsel, or as a member of the Patent Department."); Advanced Cardio-
vascular Sys., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 144 F.R.D. 372 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (attorney-client privi-
lege presumptively attaches to communications between an inventor and his or her patent
attorney); Hydraflow, Inc. v. Enidine, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626, 632 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) ("The
representation by patent counsel of an inventor in patent matters is a recognized form of
the practice of law entitled to application of the attorney-client privilege .... ).
26. Most courts now hold that when a United States or foreign registered patent agent
acts as an agent for an attorney who employed him and from whom the client is seeking
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plained below, the cases recognizing a privilege for patent agents be-
cause they function as legal practitioners are the better reasoned
opinions, and their logic should uniformly be followed.
A. Cases Recognizing a Privilege For Patent Agents
Vernitron Medical Products, Inc. v. Baxter Laboratories Inc.27 was
the first case to hold that communications with a patent agent regis-
tered in the United States can be protected under the attorney-client
privilege doctrine. In reaching its holding the court reasoned that reg-
istered patent agents function like patent attorneys in practicing
before the Patent Office and should be equally entitled to claim the
attorney-client privilege.
First, the court stated that the registration requirements to prac-
tice before the Patent Office are the same for patent attorneys and
patent agents.z8 Applicants, whether attorneys or agents, must be of
good moral character and repute. They must be possessed of legal,
scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable them to
serve clients, and they must take and pass an examination. z9
Second, both patent attorneys and patent agents must adhere to
the standards of conduct set forth in the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility adopted by the American Bar Association.3" The court
pointed out that Canon 4 of the Code directs that "[a] lawyer shall
preserve the confidences and secrets of a client."'" The court granted
a privilege for registered United States patent agents because:
[t]he substance of the function, rather than the label given to the
individual registered with the Patent Office, controls the determina-
tion here. In the special field of patents, there can be no question
that all of the considerations which support the basis for the privi-
lege between a client and a general practitioner handling an auto-
mobile accident claim apply with equal force to an inventor or other
applicant for a patent and the representative engaged to handle the
matter for him, whether he be a "patent attorney" or a "patent
agent," so long as he is registered by the Patent Office.32
advice, the communication is privileged. See, e.g., Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F.
Supp. 136 (D. Del. 1977); Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 121 F.R.D. 198, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)
("the weight of authority holds that the privilege applies to confidential communications
with patent agents acting under the authority and control of counsel."). This Article fo-
cuses on the issue of whether patent agents independently should be afforded a privilege
because they function as attorneys.
27. 186 U.S.P.Q. 324 (D.N.J. 1975).
28. Id. at 325.
29. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.341 (1975).
30. Id. See also 37 C.F.R. § 1.344 (1975).
31. Vernitron 186 U.S.P.Q. at 325.
32. Id.
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Similarly, in In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation,33 the court held
that registered United States patent agents should be afforded attor-
ney-client privilege protection. The court, following the same reason-
ing as in Vernitron, stated that under the Congressional scheme, "in
appearance and fact, the registered patent agent stands on the same
footing as an attorney in proceedings before the Patent Office."3 4 The
court concluded "[t]hat freedom of selection, protected by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Sperry, would, however, be substan-
tially impaired if as basic a protection as the attorney-client privilege
were afforded to communications involving patent attorneys but not
to those involving patent agents. 35
Other courts have followed the holdings of Vernitron and
Ampicillin and have held that a client's confidential communication
with his patent agent for the purpose of obtaining legal advice are
privileged. 36 In Dow Chemical Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co, 37 the
court reasoned that if communication with patent agents were not
protected under an evidentiary privilege, patent agents would be in an
"ethical corner. ' 38 Under Ethical Consideration 4-4 of the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, which patent agents are obli-
gated to follow, "a lawyer should endeavor to act in a manner which
preserves the evidentiary privilege ... If no privilege existed for
patent agents, the agents would be required to act in a manner which
preserves an evidentiary privilege that does not exist. The court con-
cluded that Congress could not logically have intended to hinder ap-
plicants' right to representation by a patent agent, or to hinder patent
agents in their specifically granted right to practice before the Patent
Office.4 °
33. 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Dow Chemical Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 227 U.S.P.Q. 129 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
See also Foseco Int'l Ltd. v. Fireline, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 22, 25 (N.D. Ohio 1982) ("Commu-
nications between a patent agent and a client may be privileged, however, where the patent
proceeding is before the U.S. Patent Office and the patent agent is registered with that
office."); Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1676, 1680
(E.D.N.Y. 1992) ("attorney-client privilege should be available equally to communications
of registered United States patent agents and registered United States patent attorneys.").
37. 227 U.S.P.Q. 129 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
38. Id. at 134.




B. Cases That Do Not Recognize a Privilege for Patent Agents
Some courts have rejected the reasoning that supports the opin-
ions of Vernitron, Ampicillin and Dow Chemical Co., and have refused
to recognize an attorney-client privilege for patent agents. Cases
which do not recognize a privilege for United States patent agents rest
on the formalistic distinction between membership in the patent bar
and membership in the general legal bar. These decisions are a ves-
tige of the incorrect perception that patent agents do not perform
legal work.
In Joh A. Benckiser G.m.b.H., Chemische Fabric v. Hygrade Food
Products Corp.,4 the District Court of New Jersey rejected the rea-
soning in Sperry and held that a client's communications with his reg-
istered United States patent agent could never be privileged.42 First,
the court rejected the plaintiff's argument, based on Sperry, that Con-
gress created an "independent bar" comprised of patent agents and
attorneys who are authorized to practice before the Patent Office.
Rather it narrowly defined an attorney as someone admitted to prac-
tice before some court, even as it acknowledged that a patent agent
may perform a lawyer's work. Second, the court stated that the "rule
is simply that communication between a client and an administrative
practitioner who is not an attorney are [sic] not privileged. 43
The district court of New Jersey's reliance on Falsone is mis-
placed. In Falsone, the court found that there was no privilege for a
certified public accountant (CPA) enrolled before the United States
Treasury Department to refuse to testify before the Tax Commission
and produce documents. However, a CPA representing persons
before the Treasury Department is distinguishable from a patent agent
practicing before the Patent Office for three reasons. First, according
to the court in Falsone, all preparers of tax returns, including attor-
neys, can be compelled to testify before the Tax Commission.44 Thus,
neither an attorney nor an agent can refuse to testify before the Tax
Commission. Second, under title 31 subtitle A part 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, an agent enrolled before the Treasury Depart-
ment is not authorized to practice law. The Supreme Court, however,
41. 253 F. Supp. 999 (D.N.J. 1966).
42. This case was decided by the District Court of New Jersey more than ten years
before the New Jersey court held in Vernitron that communications with registered patent
agents were privileged. Thus, the precedential value of Benckiser is minimal.
43. Benckiser, 253 F. Supp. at 1001 (citing Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th
Cir. 1953)). The court also cited an older edition of McCormick, Evidence § 92, at 185,
which stated that "[t]here is some conflict in the decisions as to whether the privilege is
available for communications to an administrative practitioner who is not a lawyer."
44. Falsone, 205 F.2d at 739.
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specifically stated in Sperry that patent agents practice law.4 5 Third,
unlike tax agents, patent agents must comply with the ethical canons
prohibiting the disclosure of privileged information.46 Thus, Benckiser
was wrongly decided, as the repudiation by the New Jersey District
Court in Vernitron indicates.
Other courts refusing to recognize a privilege for patent agents
have provided scant reasoning for their decisions.47 Additionally, the
decisions appear to be based on a misunderstanding of the patent
agent's role. For example, in Sneider, the court described the work of
a patent agent as "quasi-legal service."48 Because the Supreme Court
in Sperry v. Florida clearly stated that patent agents perform legal
work, cases which provide no reasoning or repudiated reasoning
should be rejected.
Similarly, in Status Time Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.," the
court refused to recognize a privilege for foreign patent agents where
the communication was with a United States law firm.5" The court
rejected Vernitron and Ampicillin and seemed to follow the analysis in
Benckiser, although the court did not cite the case. The court rea-
soned that the relationship between a client and a foreign patent agent
is analogous to a client and his accountant, banker, or investment ad-
visor and concluded that "the necessity for 'unrestricted and un-
bounded confidence' between a client and his attorney which justifies
the uniquely restrictive attorney-client privilege simply does not exist
in the other relationships."'" However, the Status Time court failed to
45. Sperry, 373 U.S. at 383.
46. Under 37 CFR § 1.344 both patent attorneys and patent agents must conform to
the standards of ethical and professional conduct set forth in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, including Canon 4 on presentation of client confidences and secrets.
47. See, e.g., Rayette-Faberge, Inc. v. John Oster Mfg. Co., 47 F.R.D. 524 (E.D. Wis.
1969) (communication between patent agent and plaintiff's counsel not privileged);
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1169 (D.S.C. 1974) ("adopt[ing]
the rule that no communications from patent agents, whether American or foreign, are
subject to an attorney-client privilege in the United States"); Detection Sys., Inc. v. Pittway
Corp., 96 F.R.D. 152, 155 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) ("As a general rule, 'no communications from
patent agents, whether American or foreign, are subject to an attorney-client privilege in
the United States."') (citing Duplan, 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974)); Sneider v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 91 F.R.D. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (no privilege for patent agents).
48. 91 F.R.D. at 4.
49. 95 F.R.D. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
50. As discussed below, where the foreign patent agent's communication does not
touch base with the United States, the majority of courts hold that under principles of
comity, foreign law determines if the communication is privileged. This Article argues that
a functional approach should be applied in determining whether a foreign or domestic
patent agent should be treated as an attorney for purposes of the privilege.
51. Status Time, 95 F.R.D. at 33.
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explain why the relationship between a client and a patent agent is
more akin to that of an accountant than an attorney.
The reasoning in Status Time, as in Benckiser, is faulty because it
is premised on an erroneous view of a patent agent's work and re-
sponsibilities. Magistrate Judge Gershon acknowledged that "the gen-
eral purpose of the attorney-client privilege is 'to promote freedom of
consultation of legal advisers by clients."' 2 But Gershon miscon-
strued the role of the patent agent by ignoring the agent's responsibil-
ity as a practitioner of patent law licensed by the United States Patent
Office or a foreign patent office. The Supreme Court in Sperry v.
Florida clearly ruled that patent agents practice law. Since patent
agents practice law, they are "legal advisors" on the subject of patents
and should be afforded the same privilege as other legal advisors. Sta-
tus Time does not identify any way in which the role of a "patent prac-
titioner" differs from one who is an attorney admitted to a bar of a
state and is engaged in the work of prosecuting patents. Thus, the
holding in Status Time is based on a misunderstanding of the function
of patent agents and should be rejected.
C. Consistent Recognition of a Privilege for United'States Patent Agents
Patent agents function as legal practitioners in advising and rep-
resenting clients before the Patent Office. The Supreme Court has
stated that patent agents, like patent attorneys, are authorized by
Congress to practice before the Patent Office and to perform legal
services. Moreover, patent agents, like patent attorneys, are bound by
a duty to protect their clients' secrets and confidential communica-
tions. Thus, clients have a legitimate expectation of confidentiality in
their communications with patent agents. The cases that do not recog-
nize a privilege53 are premised on inaccurate or rejected assumptions
about the role of patent agents. Courts should therefore recognize an
attorney-client privilege relating to legal advice pertaining to patent
prosecutions (the process of obtaining a patent) for patent agents reg-
istered to practice before the United States Patent Office.
52. Id. at 32 (quoting Application of John Doe, 464 F. Supp. 757, 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(citing 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2291, at 545 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961))).
53. Joh A. Benckiser G.m.b.H., Chemische Fabric v. Hygrade Food Products Corp.
253,F. Supp. 999 (D.N.J. 1966); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146,
1169 (D.S.C. 1974); Detection Sys., Inc. v. Pittway Corp., 96 F.R.D. 152, 155 (W.D.N.Y.
1982); Sneider v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 91 F.R.D. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Status Time Corp. v.
Sharp Electronics Corp. 95 F.R.D. 27 (S.D.N;Y. 1982).
HASTINGS COMM/ENT W.. [Vol. 16:433
IRecognition of a Privilege for Foreign Patent Agents
The issue of whether foreign patent agents should be entitled to
an attorney-client privilege often arises in patent litigations involving
multi-national corporations. Many times the invention at issue in liti-
gation in the United States has already been patented around the
world. Courts in the United States have held that documents related
to the corresponding foreign patents, are discoverable because they
are relevant to the United States litigation.54 Often, however, the for-
eign patent prosecutions have been handled by foreign patent agents.
This frequently leads to litigation on the issue of whether, although
relevant, communications between foreign patent agents and their for-
eign clients are immune from discovery under the attorney-client
privilege.
A. Role of Foreign Patent Agents
In many foreign countries patent agents are a distinct segment of
the legal profession. They are the primary providers of legal services
and advice for those pursuing patent rights in the foreign patent of-
fice. The patent agents are, as a practical matter, the only practition-
ers who handle patent prosecutions, and are often called patent
attorneys.55
United States courts have.recognized that foreign patent agents
perform specialized legal services akin to attorneys at law.56 How-
ever, despite the recognition of the unique role of foreign patent
agents, United States courts have been divided on the issue of
whether a privilege for a foreign patent agent should be recognized in
United States litigation.
B. Privilege for Foreign Patent Agents under the Traditional Choice of
Law Analysis
The majority of United States district courts in deciding whether
to recognize a privilege for foreign patent agents, engage in a form of
54. See, e.g., Laitram Corp. v. Depoe Bay Fish Co., 549 F. Supp. 29, 33 (D.Or. 1982)
(stating a foreign patent application is evidence of the level of skill in the pertinent art and
is discoverable).
55. See Kopacz, Note, The European Patent Attorney Qualifying Examination: An
American Perspective, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 47, 51-52 (1987).
56. The court in Golden Trade, S.r.L. v. Lee Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D. 512 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), in deciding whether to find a privilege for communications between an Italian cor-
poration and its Norwegian, German, and Israeli patent agents, concluded that the eviden-
tiary record suggests that "the foreign patent agents, perform services akin to lawyers in
their field of specialization." Id. at 522.
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traditional choice of law analysis: communications on issues involving
the United States are governed by United States law while communi-
cations relating solely to matters involving a foreign country such as
communications between a foreign patent agent and a foreign investor
regarding foreign patent rights, are governed by the applicable foreign
statute.57 If communications between clients and patent agents that
do not touch base with the United States are recognized as privileged
under the foreign statute, then the United States court will also recog-
nize the privilege.
This approach presents an additional burden on a foreign com-
pany litigating a patent infringement action in the United States. The
foreign company must provide detailed affidavits of the laws of each
country in which it had a confidential communication with its patent
agent, and bears the burden of proving that each of those countries
recognizes a privilege for its patent agents.58 Satisfying a district court
that a foreign country recognizes a privilege is an impracticable stan-
dard, because many countries do not have open discovery as in the
United States, and therefore, do not need to have explicit laws or judi-
cial opinions recognizing a privilege for patent agents. For example,
in Alpen Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co.,59 the court held that a com-
munication between a Japanese patent agent and his client was discov-
erable. The court ruled that a provision of the Japanese Code of Civil
Procedure which stated that a patent agent could not testify concern-
ing confidential information obtained in the course of performing pro-
fessional duties was not the equivalent of an attorney-client privilege.
This ill-advised ruling failed to appreciate that in a Japanese court an
explicit privilege would not be necessary because the documents
would not be discoverable in the first instance. Moreover, the duty to
preserve client confidences is the equivalent of a privilege designed to
protect client confidences from disclosure.
57. Id. at 520. (citing Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1169-
70 (D.S.C. 1974); In Golden Trade, the court cited the following cases that followed the
choice-of-law contacts analysis: Willemijn Houdstermaatschaapij BV v. Apollo Computer
Inc., 707 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Del. 1989); Chubb Integrated Sys., Ltd. v. National Bank, 103
F.R.D. 52 (D.D.C. 1984); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Ill.
1982); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978); Novamont North-
America Inc. v. Warner Lambert Co., 1992 WL 114507 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Baxter Travenol
Labs., Inc. v. Abbot Labs., 1987 WL 12919 (N.D. II. 1987). See also Variable-Parameter
Fixture Dev. Corp. v. Morpheus Lights Inc., 1992 WL 203865 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Burroughs
Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 611 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
58. See, e.g., Burroughs Wellcome, 143 F.R.D. at 611; Willemijn, 707 F. Supp. at 1429;
Baxter, 1987 WL 12919, in which the party claiming privilege for communications with its
foreign agents could not satisfy its burden of proving that every country at issue recognized
a privilege for patent agents.
59. 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS. 39121 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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C. Non-Recognition of a Privilege for Foreign Patent Agents
Other United States courts appear to have renounced the choice
of law approach, and have summarily rejected a privilege for foreign
patent agents without even considering whether the foreign law recog-
nizes such a privilege.' For example, in Status Time,6 the Court de-
nied a privilege to foreign patent agents because the plaintiff failed to
show that the patent agents were either members of a bar in the
United States or agents of such members.
D. A Functional Approach
A third approach, and the one advocated here, is a functional
approach. Application of an attorney-client privilege to United States
patent agents based upon the fact that they perform legal functions
logically would compel application of the privilege to foreign patent
agents, who are often the primary providers of legal services and ad-
vice for those pursuing patent rights in foreign patent offices. Under
the functional approach, a party in United States litigation claiming a
privilege for a foreign patent agent would have to demonstrate that
the foreign patent agent performed a function equivalent to a legal
practitioner in the field of patent law. If the party claiming the privi-
lege for communications with his foreign patent agents could meet
this burden, then no further inquiry into the foreign law would be
required.
The court in Vernitron62 advocated taking the same functional ap-
proach for determining privilege for communications with foreign pat-
ent agents as for United States patent agents:
The same situation obviously exists in connection with the process-
ing of patent claims in other countries, and the nature of the subject
is such that patterns essentially the same as those which exist in the
United States are found there .... Whenever applicable law limits
the performance of essentially legal functions to individuals specifi-
cally authorized to that end, the underlying basis for the privilege,
i.e., the right to communicate on a basis of full disclosure to the end
that professional service may be effectively provided, must be given
its natural effect.63
This functional approach for determining whether to grant attor-
ney-client privilege for foreign patent agents is similar to the one
60. See, e.g., Status Time Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 95 F.R.D. 27 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Novamont North-America Inc., v. Warner Lambert Co., 1992 WL 114507 (S.D.N.Y.
1992).
61. 95 F.R.D. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). For a further discussion of Status Time, see supra
notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
62. 186 U.S.P.Q. 324 (D.N.J. 1975).
63. Id. at 325-26.
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taken for other foreign legal practitioners. For example, in Renfield
Corp. v. E. Remy Martin & Co., S.A.,' the court held that a French in-
house counsel, who was not a member of the French Bar, had the
benefit of an attorney-client privilege in the United States.65 The court
concluded:
Because there is no French equivalent to the American 'bar' in this
context, membership in a 'bar' cannot be the relevant criterion for
whether the attorney-client privilege is available. Rather, the re-
quirement is a functional one of whether the individuals competent
to render legal advice and is permitted by law to do SO. 6 6
In short, a functional approach to determining whether a foreign
patent agent should be afforded an attorney-client privilege in a
United States litigation would foster a fairer, simpler and more certain
privilege for foreign and domestic litigants. The party claiming the
privilege would have to demonstrate that the patent agent at issue was
functioning as an authorized legal advisor during a confidential com-
munication between the patent agent and client.
Conclusion
Registered patent agents in the United States are the functional
equivalent of patent attorneys and should be consistently granted the
status of an attorney for purposes of the attorney-client privilege.
Congress has authorized both attorneys at law and patent agents to
practice law before the Patent Office. Moreover, the Supreme Court
held in Sperry that patent agents provide legal services and are re-
quired to maintain their client's confidences and secrets. Thus, there
is no rational basis for denying to patent agents the attorney-client
privilege merely because they are not admitted to the bar of a state.
Similarly, a determination of whether a foreign patent agent is
afforded a privilege ina United States court should be based upon a
functional approach. If a registered foreign patent agent is engaged in
the authorized practice of patent law, in his or her own country, the
agent should be considered the functional equivalent of an attorney
and be entitled to the protections of the attorney-client privilege.
64. 98 F.R.D. 442 (D.Del. 1982).
65. Id. at 444. The court did not consider the French law on privilege for French in-
house counsel to be determinative.
66. Id. (emphasis added). See also Leybold-Heraeus Technologies, Inc. v. Midwest
Instrument Co., 118 F.R.D. 609, 613 (E.D. Wis. 1987) (holding that a German patent attor-
ney "falls within definition of an attorney to which the privilege applies"); United States v.
Sindona, 636 F.2d 792, 804 (2d Cir. 1980) cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981) (communications
with a Venezuelan attorney held to be privileged without inquiry into foreign law).
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In sum, when registered United States or foreign patent agents
function as attorneys, they should be afforded the same privilege as
attorneys.

